

~~SECRET~~

CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

I. From September 1960 until August 1961, at least 20 major shipments of bloc military supplies, totaling well over 50,000 tons, arrived in Cuba. Extensive military training has also been provided. It is estimated that roughly \$100,000,000 worth of equipment and services have been provided. Most has come from the USSR and Czechoslovakia, though Red China has sent some weapons.

A. The focus recently has been on assimilation of equipment and on training. But a new series of shipments began this month as a result of negotiations last summer.

B. The Soviet merchant ship Almetevsk arrived in a Cuban port on 4 January under circumstances strongly suggesting it was carrying arms. Another Soviet ship, the Fizik Lebedev, is en route to Cuba possibly with a military cargo. In addition, on 7 January a Soviet ship reportedly towing a small naval patrol vessel and carrying as many as four motor torpedo boats on deck was sighted in mid-Atlantic probably headed for Cuba. Another Soviet vessel was sighted in mid-January towing a naval gunboat toward Cuba.

II. Arms deliveries have included field and antiaircraft artillery, rocket launchers, medium and heavy tanks, and thousands of modern small arms. Aircraft supplied include at least 50, possibly as many as 75, MIGs, some of them MIG-19 supersonic interceptors, as well as a number of helicopters, piston trainers, and small transports.

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000300220023-4

III. The capabilities of the Cuban armed forces have increased steadily and probably now surpass those of any other Latin American country. Ground forces are estimated at about 75,000 full-time army and militia, plus about 100,000 in the militia ready reserve and another 100,000 in part-time militia. Air force capabilities have been greatly enhanced; most of the some 75 Cuban pilots trained in the bloc are believed to have returned. The relatively weak navy is only now beginning to receive equipment from the bloc.

IV. Cuba's armed forces still have little offensive capability outside Cuba. But bloc aid is helping develop a body of well-trained cadres which could be used to lead or support guerrilla operations elsewhere.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP64B00346R000300220023-4